Richmond v. Polk
375 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2004) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 11
Fall 9-1-2004
Richmond v. Polk 375 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2004)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Fourth Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School
of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richmond v. Polk 375 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2004), 17 Cap. DEF J. 157 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol17/iss1/11
Richmond v. Polk
375 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2004)
L Facts
Early in the morning of November 2,1991, Earl Richmond,Jr., after a night
of drinking and doing drugs, went to the trailer of Helisa Hayes, his best friend's
wife. Richmond raped and strangled Hayes, then murdered her two children,
Phillip and Darien. Richmond evaded capture for three months until his sister,
Andrea Knight, told police that she had driven her brother to a spot near Hayes's
trailer early on November 2. Upon police request, Richmond submitted DNA
for a suspect rape kit. That DNA matched the semen found in Hayes's body.
On April 3, 1992, Richmond heard about the DNA match and confessed to the
murders.'
On July 6,1992, Richmond was indicted by a North Carolina grand jury on
one count of first-degree rape and three counts of first-degree murder.2 Before
Richmond's trial for the Hayes murders, federal prosecutors charged him with
the murder of Lisa Ann Nadeau in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.' Richmond had strangled Nadeau on April 4, 1991, at
Fort Dix military base.4 On May 28, 1993, a jury convicted Richmond of
Nadeau's murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole.' Prior to trial for Hayes's murder, the North Carolina trial court ruled
to allow the State to introduce evidence of Richmond's prior federal murder
conviction.6 In response, Richmond "requested the court's permission to ask
potential jurors during voir dire whether 'if... knowing that [Richmond] had a
previous first-degree murder conviction, they could still consider mitigating
circumstances. . . in determining what their ultimate recommendation as to life
or death is going to be.' "" The court denied the question and instructed Rich-
1. Richmond v. Polk, 375 F.3d 309, 314-16 (4th Cir. 2004).
2. Id at 316; see N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-27.2(a)(2)(b) (2003) (stating that "[a] person is guilty
of rape in the first degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse... [w]ith another person by
force and against the will of the other person, and ... inflicts serious personal injury upon the
victim"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7 (2003) (stating that "[a] murder... which shall be committed in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of... rape or a sex offense... shall be deemed to be
murder in the first degree.., and ... shall be punished with death or imprisonment in the State's
prison for life without parole').




7. Id (quoting State v. Richmond, 495 S.E.2d 677, 683 (N.C. 1998)),
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mond's attorneys to ask broader questions in order to ascertain the potential
jurors' opinions about the death penalty.8 During the trial, Richmond attempted
to secure a voluntary intoxication jury instruction by introducing evidence
concerning his alcohol abuse.' The trial court refused to give the instruction
because Richmond "failed to produce substantial evidence showing that he was
'utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill.'
On May 24, 1995, the jury found Richmond guilty on all charges." A
sentencing hearing was scheduled for the next day.12 Richmond moved for a jury
instruction that his sentence on the federal murder charge made him ineligible for
parole.' 3 Stating that "North Carolina law.., does not allow jurors to consider
parole eligibility when making sentencing decisions," the trial court denied the
motion. 4 The jury found five mitigating factors and three aggravating factors,
and imposed the death sentence for Richmond's murder convictions and life
imprisonment for the rape conviction.'
The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Richmond's convictions
and death sentence on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 16 On September 13, 1999, Richmond filed a motion for appropriate
relief ("MAR") in the Superior Court for Cumberland County, claiming that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") in both the guilt and
8. Id.
9. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 317. Richmond's sisters testified that he drank beer regularly and
had consumed a large amount before attending the party on November 1, 1991. Id. at 316-17.
They also stated that he had drunk a good deal of hard liquor, taken a hit of crack cocaine, and
consequently became "extremely obnoxious," which they stated was an unusual reaction for him.
Id. at 316.
10. Id. at 317(quoting Richmond, 495 S.E.2d at 689). In their closing argument, Richmond's
attorneys mentioned Richmond's intoxication on the morning of the murders to suggest that he
"did not act with premeditation and deliberation." Id The State responded that there could be no
reasonable doubt that Richmond had acted with premeditation and deliberation because he "went
to Ms. Hayes' [sic] home at 3:45 a.m. with the sole purpose of raping her, and that once he
murdered her, he purposely searched out her children.., and killed them so as to ensure that there
would be no witnesses." Id. at 318.




15. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 319. The jury found as mitigating factors that: "(1) Richmond
committed the crimes while suffering from mental or emotional disturbance; (2) Richmond
committed the crimes while under the influence of alcohol; (3) Richmond suffers from severe
personality disorder; (4) Richmond's use of alcohol and drugs had an effect on his behavior; and
(5) Richmond's father mentally abused him." Id. at 319 n.2; see N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 15A-2000()
(2003) (listing the mitigating factors a jury might find in a capital sentencing proceeding).
16. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 319; Richmond, 495 S.E.2d at 683.
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sentencing phases of his trial.17 He also filed motions on October 10, 1999, for
the appointment of substance abuse and sexual abuse experts.' Although the
superior court granted his requests for experts, it denied his MAR on the plead-
ings on November 22, 1999."9 The court held that the [AC claims were without
merit and that Richmond had procedurally defaulted them by failing to attach
evidentiary affidavits as required by North Carolina General Statute Section 15A-
1420(b)(1)2 Richmond attempted to cure his procedural default with an
amended MAR accompanied by affidavits and by filing a motion for reconsidera-
tion on December 2, 1999.21 The superior court denied his motion, and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina denied his petition for a writ of certiorari on
these issues."
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Richmond filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina on April 28, 2000.23 The district court granted the State's motion for
summary judgment on the petition but granted Richmond a certificate of
appealability ("COA") on four claims.24 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit granted Richmond an additional COA for one more claim.
2
Richmond ultimately presented three categories of claims to the Fourth Circuit:
(1) his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance in both the guilt and penalty
phases of his trial by failing to present expert testimony regarding his substance
17. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 319; seeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420(2003) (requiring a defendant
seeking relief of a judgment to file claims in the trial court in which he was convicted).
18. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 320.
19. Id
20. Id. at 320, 322; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420(b)(1) (providing that "[a] motion for
appropriate relief made after the entry of judgment must be supported by affidavit or other
documentary evidence if based upon the existence or occurrence of facts which are not ascertain-
able from the records ... or which are not within the knowledge of the judge who hears the
motion").
21. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 320.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (outlining the requirements for a federal court to grant
habeas corpus relief, part of AEDPA). Because Richmond filed his habeas petition after the 1996
effective date of AEDPA, the Act's provisions applied in his case. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 321.
24. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 320. The district court granted the COA on Richmond's Morgan
claim, his IAC claim for counsel's failure to present testimony regarding his substance abuse during
the guilt phase, his IAC claim for counsel's failure to present testimony regarding his substance
abuse during the sentencing phase, and his Simmons claim. Id
25. Id; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000) (defining the requirements for a federal habeas
corpus appeal to the courts of appeals; part of AEDPA). Richmond filed a motion "to extend the
time to file a request to expand his certificate of appealability to include three additional claims."
Richmond, 375 F.3d at 320. The Fourth Circuit granted him the time extension and allowed him to
include his IAC claim for counsel's failure to "retain a sexual abuse expert and ... request that
childhood sexual abuse be presented to the jury as a possible mitigating factor." Id.
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abuse and his alleged childhood sexual abuse; (2) the state court violated Morgan
v. I/linoi 6 by not allowing his specific question in voir dire; and (3) the state court
violated Simmons v. South Carolina2 7 by denying him a jury instruction that made
clear that he was ineligible for parole.28
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Richmond's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.29 The court stated that under Coleman v.
Thompson" it could not consider Richmond's LAC claims because he had proce-
durally defaulted them in state court.31 It further held, under the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), that the Supreme Court
of North Carolina's denial of Richmond's Morgan claim "was neither contrary to
nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law."' 32 Although
the court did find the Supreme Court of North Carolina's treatment of Rich-
mond's Simmons claim to be an unreasonable application of federal law, it held
that such an application was harmless error under Brecht v. Abrahamson.
33
Ill. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The Fourth Circuit noted that it must "review de novo a district court's
decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a state record. '34 The
Fourth Circuit clarified its standard of review by explaining the limits that
26. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
27. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
28. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 320; see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738 (1992) (stating that
due process requires disqualification of "[alny juror who states that he or she will automatically vote
for the death penalty [in every murder case] without regard to the mitigating evidence"); Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (holding that "where the defendant's future dangerous-
ness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that
the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible").
29. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 314.
30. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
31. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 322; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (stating
that a federal habeas court cannot review claims procedurally defaulted "pursuant to an independent
and adequate state procedural rule... unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law"); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (holding that a state court's denial of a claim on "an independent and adequate
state procedural ground" bars review in the federal courts).
32. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 336 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
33. Id at 334-35 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993)).
34. Id. at 320-21.
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AEDPA places on a court's consideration of federal habeas corpus cases. 35 It
pointed out that a federal court cannot grant a habeas corpus petition unless "the
state court's holding 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.' ,36 The Fourth Circuit also mentioned AEDPA's fact-finding
standard that a federal court, finding no contrary or unreasonable application of
federal law, could not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless "the state court's
holding.. . 'resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing. )37
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Richmond presented three JAC claims in his appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
38
First, he claimed that his counsel were ineffective in the guilt phase by not
presenting expert and lay testimony that he was so intoxicated on the morning
of the murders that he could not have premeditated the murders.39 He argued
that his counsel's failure in this matter prevented the court from giving the jury
an instruction on voluntary intoxication.' Second, he asserted that his counsel
were ineffective in the penalty phase for not presenting similar testimony and
additional evidence that his substance abuse made it impossible for him to
control his rage while intoxicated.4' Such testimony, he claimed, would have
provided the jury with additional mitigating evidence and allowed them to find
that the comparison of mitigating and aggravating circumstances warranted a
sentence of life.42 Richmond's final LAC claim involved his defense counsel's
failure to obtain a sexual abuse expert and present, during the penalty phase of
35. Id. at 321.
36. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
37. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).
38. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 321-22.
39. Id at 326.
40. Id Richmond provided expert evidence that he "suffered from severe personality
disorders and chronic depression, grew up in a dysfunctional family and suffered from mixed
substance abuse disorder." Id. at 318-19. Richmond's attorneys argued, in light of this evidence,
that Richmond "had a diminished capacity to control his behavior outside of a structured environ-
ment, and had a diminished capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform his
behavior to the requirements of the law." Id at 319. The State rebutted this evidence with experts
of its own, who testified that "despite his severe personality disorder and likely drug and alcohol
consumption, [Richmond] was goal-oriented and thoughtful" the morning of the murders and that
he could "appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform to the requirements of the law."
Id
41. Id. at 321-22. Richmond claimed that the rage resulted from sexual abuse he suffered
as a child. Id
42. Id at 327.
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the trial, evidence concerning Richmond's alleged childhood sexual abuse.43
Richmond argued that his counsel had notice of such abuse from Richmond's
sister and thus should have pursued this evidence in mitigation. 4'
The Fourth Circuit noted that North Carolina law requires a defendant to
file an MAR in order to bring a claim for IAC in postconviction proceedings. 5
If the MAR contains claims " 'based upon the existence or occurrence of facts
which are not ascertainable from the records and any transcripts of the case or
which are not within the knowledge of the judge who hears the motion,' " the
movant must support the MAR " 'by affidavit or other documentary evi-
dence.' "' The Superior Court for Cumberland County held that Richmond
procedurally defaulted his first two IAC claims because they did not contain the
proper supporting affidavits and that he defaulted his third claim because the
affidavit "did not actually support" the claim.47
The Fourth Circuit noted that Coleman bars a federal court from granting a
habeas corpus claim that has been procedurally defaulted in state court if the
default relies on " 'an independent and adequate state procedural rule... unless
the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result
of the alleged violation of federal law.' "8 Murray v. Carrier49 holds that if "cause"
and "prejudice" cannot be shown, the court will not excuse a default except
where failure to do so would cause a " 'fundamental miscarriage of justice.' 50
In Richmond's case, the Fourth Circuit, citing Johnson v. Mississibp?, and Ake v.
Oklahoma,5 2 stated that "[a] state procedural rule is 'adequate' if it is firmly estab-
lished and regularly or consistently applied by the state court, and 'independent'
if it does not depend on a federal constitutional ruling."53 The court found that
the North Carolina rule requiring that a MAR be supported by an evidentiary
affidavit was an "adequate" state procedural rule because North Carolina had
43. Id. at 322.
44. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 328.
45. Id. at 322; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420 (2003) (outlining the procedure for
postconvicion relief.
46. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 322 n.4 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420(b)(l)).
47. Id at 322. The Fourth Circuit stated that "[tihe Cumberland County Superior Court
concluded that Dr. Lisak's affidavit did not support Richmond's claim because, in addition to
containing cumulative speculation, it acknowledged that Richmond did not recall being sexually
abused as a child by his father and that Richmond's father adamantly denied sexually abusing him."
Id.
48. Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 722).
49. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
50. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 323 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)).
51. 486 U.S. 578 (1988).
52. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
53. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 323 (citations omitted) (citingJohnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578,
587 (1988); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)).
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regularly applied the rule before considering Richmond's claim. 4 The court
determined that section 15A-1420(b)(1) was independent because it did not
"depend on any federal constitutional ruling."55
Upon finding North Carolina's procedural default of Richmond's IAC
claims to be valid, the Fourth Circuit turned to whether Richmond was able to
show cause and actual prejudice.56 The court relied on Murray for the rule that
in order to show cause the defendant must " 'show that some objective factor
external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with' " the local
rule.57 Richmond argued that the superior court acted as the outside factor by
not appointing his substance and sexual abuse experts in time to provide sup-
porting affidavits and by not notifying his counsel "that a ruling was imminent."5'8
The Fourth Circuit rejected these claims as insufficient to show cause and found
that Richmond had "sufficient time to work with, and obtain an adequate affida-
vit" from his experts.59 Richmond's counsel, the court continued, could have
moved for the experts earlier, worked with them more quickly, and filed the
MAR later.6' The court further found that the superior court "was not obligated
to notify [Richmond] that it was preparing to rule on his MAR."' The Fourth
Circuit thus determined that Richmond did not show cause for his default.
62
Despite finding no cause, the Fourth Circuit went on to state that Rich-
mond had also not shown actual prejudice resulting from his IAC claims. 63 To
show actual prejudice, the court stated, Richmond would have needed to demon-
strate " 'that the errors at his trial... worked to his actual and substantial disad-
54. Id. at 323-24 (citing State v. Ware, 482 S.E.2d 14, 16 (N.C. 1997); State v. Payne, 325
S.E.2d 205, 219 (N.C. 1985); State v. Parker, 300 S.E.2d 451, 453 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)).
55. Id. at 324. Although Richmond did not claim that North Carolina's MAR rule was
inadequate or dependent upon a federal ruling, he did argue that North Carolina had applied the
rule in a "haphazard manner." Id. at 323 n.5. He claimed that the superior court haphazardly
defaulted his MAR because it ignored the fact that Richmond cured the default with an amended
motion that included an affidavit; it granted his requests for expert assistance, thus implying to his
counsel that it would not rule on the unamended MAR; and North Carolina courts usually take a
year and a half to rule on MARs. Id Finding that the superior court's decisions on reconsideration
and ruling time were completely within its discretion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Richmond's
arguments. Id. at 323-24 n.5.
56. Id. at 324; see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (holding that a procedurally defaulted claim "is
barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of
the alleged violation of federal law").
57. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 324 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).
58. Id. at 325.
59. Id.
60. Id. Richmond filed for the original MAR on September 13, moved for his experts on
October 10, and filed the amended MAR on November 23. Id. at 319-20.
61. Id at 325.
62. Id
63. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 325-26.
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vantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.' "'
Despite the evidence of Richmond's copious consumption of alcohol and drug
use on the morning of the murders, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's finding that "' there [was] little evidence of the degree
of his intoxication at the time of the murders."' 65 The Fourth Circuit found that
Richmond's proposed expert testimony would not have helped him prove that
he was too intoxicated to premeditate or deliberate.' Consequently, the court
found that Richmond did not satisfy the actual prejudice requirement for his guilt
phase JAC claim.67
The Fourth Circuit applied a different prejudice standard to Richmond's
sentencing phase JAC claims. Relying on the Supreme Court's definition of
actual prejudice in Strickland v. Washington,68 the court demanded that Richmond
show" 'a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer... would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did
not warrant death.' "69 The Fourth Circuit pointed out, in addressing
Richmond's second IAC claim, that a good deal of evidence about "Richmond's
substance abuse and its effect on his behavior was sufficiently put before the
jury" and that the jury found several mitigating factors based on that evidence.
0
The Fourth Circuit noted that despite the evidence and finding of mitigation, the
jury nonetheless imposed the death penalty.7 Consequently, the court found that
the probability that the outcome would have been different was too low to meet
the Strickland prejudice standard.
7 -2
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Richmond's third IAC argument of coun-
sel's failure to obtain a sexual abuse expert and to present evidence of sexual
abuse in mitigation." According to the court, these failures did not cause actual
prejudice because the proposed evidence was too weak to undermine confidence
in the outcome.74 Because Richmond could show neither cause nor prejudice,
64. Id. at 326 (quoting McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir. 2000)).
65. Id. (quoting Richmond, 495 S.E.2d at 688 (alteration in original)).
66. Id at 327.
67. Id at 327, 328-29.
68. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
69. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 327 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)).
Strckland defines a "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." Strickand, 466 U.S. at 694.
70. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 327-28.
71. Id at 328.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id The court noted the following (1) Richmond's sister only believed that he had been
sexually abused by their father; (2) that belief was not supported by evidence; (3) Richmond did not




the Fourth Circuit held that it could not rule on the merits of any of his three
IAC claims.75
C Morgan Claim
Richmond argued that under Moran, he had a right to ask potential jurors,
"'if... knowing that [Richmond] had a previous first-degree murder conviction,
could they still consider mitigating circumstances ... in determining their ulti-
mate recommendation as to life or death.' "76 The Fourth Circuit pointed out
that Morgan expands "[t]he Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments[ ] 'guarantee [that]
a defendant on trial for his life [has] [a] right to an impartial jury."' 77 According
to Morgan, capital defendants may use voir dire to empanel a jury that does not
believe that " 'death should be imposed ipsofacto upon conviction of a capital
offense,'" that will not " 'impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances
of conviction,' "and that will "be able to follow the court's instructions and [its]
oath."78 To ascertain the prospective jurors' views on the death penalty, Rich-
mond's counsel asked the court to allow them to ask the specific question
concerning Richmond's prior federal murder conviction.79 The trial court
rejected this question as too narrow and found it to be a " 'stakeout' question
aimed at determining a prospective juror's answers to legal questions before
being informed of the legal principles applicable to their sentencing recommenda-
tion.Y80 The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed that Richmond's pro-
posed question was an improper "stakeout" question and ruled that the trial
court did not violate Morgan by disallowing the question.8
To rule for Richmond on this claim, the Fourth Circuit would have needed
to find that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's treatment of Mogan" 'was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' ,,12 The
75. Id. at 328-29.
76. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 329 (quoting Richmond, 495 S.E.2d at 683); see Morgan, 504 U.S. at
732 (holding "that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recom-
mended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its inflic-
tion") (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-23 (1968)).
77. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 329 (quoting Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728).
78. Id (quoting Motgan, 504 U.S. at 728, 735); see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,170 n.7
(1986) (stating that a party "must be given the opportunity to identify [problematic] prospective
jurors by questioning them at voir dire about their views of the death penalty").
79. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 329.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 329-30. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that such a question would
serve to " 'indoctrinate liurors] regarding potential issues before the evidence has been presented
and [they] have been instructed on the law.'" Id at 330 (quoting Richmond, 495 S.E.2d at 683).
82. Id. at 321 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
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court pointed out that the United States Supreme Court held in Williams v.
Tqylor 3 that "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of' were two distinct
categories.' 4 To define "contrary to," the Fourth Circuit relied on Bellv. Cone,85
which provided that "[a] state court decision is contrary to clearly established
federal law 'if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set
forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the
Supreme Court has] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.' "86 Bell also
provided that an unreasonable application occurs when a "state court correctly
identifies the governing legal principle ... but unreasonably applies it to the facts
of the particular case."87 The Fourth Circuit noted that an unreasonable applica-
tion need not be merely wrong, but it" 'must also be unreasonable.' "88
The court found that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's treatment of
Richmond's voir dire claim "was neither 'contrary to' nor 'an unreasonable
application' of Morgan."89 It noted that Morgan did not require that a defendant
be able to ask questions in order to determine "what a prospective juror's
sentencing decision will be if presented with a specific state of evidence or
circumstances."9 Instead, Morgan allowed for broad questions to determine
"'the [prospective] jurors' ability to give due consideration to mitigating evidence
at sentencing.' "91 The court found that Richmond was able to ask voir dire
questions that solicited jurors' views on the death penalty, their ability to give
consideration to mitigation evidence, their openness to a life sentence, and their
inclination to impose the death penalty automati.ally in cases of capital murder.
92
Because Richmond's voir dire allowed him "to identify prospective jurors
holding the misconception that 'death should be imposed ipsofacto upon convic-
tion of a capital offense,"' the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court
of North Carolina had applied Morgan in accord with federal law.
9 3
D. Simmons Claim
Richmond argued that the trial court erred in denying him a Simmons instruc-
tion and that the Supreme Court of North Carolina unreasonably applied Simmons
83. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
84. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 321 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000)).
85. 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
86. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 321 (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)) (alteration in
original).
87. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
88. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 321 (quoting Willams, 529 U.S. at 411).
89. Id. at 330 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
90. Id
91. Id (quoting Oken v. Cocoran, 220 F.3d 259, 274 (4th Cir. 2000)).
92. Id at 330-31.
93. Id at 331 (quoting Mogan, 504 U.S. at 735).
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in affirming his death sentence.9 4 Because of his 1993 federal murder conviction,
Richmond was already under a life sentence with no possibility of parole when
his trial for the Hayes murders began.9" Richmond pointed out that Simmons
requires that the jury be informed of a defendant's parole ineligibility when the
prosecution argues that he will pose a future danger to society. 96 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina found that the trial court did not err by failing to
instruct the jury on this point because the prosecution limited its argument to
Richmond's future dangerousness in prison.97 The State argued further that
Simmons should not apply when the parole ineligibility arises from a federal
conviction.'8
The Fourth Circuit found that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
application of Simmons in Richmond's case was unreasonable." The court did
not accept the state court's conclusion that the prosecution's statements about
Richmond's life in prison eliminated the prejudice of its closing argument that
" 'there is only one way you can ensure that this defendant does not kill again,
and that is to impose the penalty that he has earned and worked for and de-
serves.' ""' The Fourth Circuit likened this statement to the jury argument in
Simmons that imposing a death sentence would be " 'an act of self defense.' ""'
The court concluded that the jury would not have seen the prosecution's com-
ments about prison life as limiting its future-dangerousness claim and that the
prosecution was in fact arguing about the danger Richmond posed to society
outside of prison. 02 The court rejected the State's claim that Simmons did not
apply because Richmond's previous conviction was federal and stated that "the
Court's holding in Simmons stands for the principle of law that elemental due
process requires that capital defendants ... have the opportunity to inform the
jury of their parole ineligibility irrespective of how it came about."' 0 ' Finding
that the prosecution did put at issue Richmond's future dangerousness outside
of prison, the court held the Supreme Court of North Carolina's application of
Simmons unreasonable."
°4
94. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 331.
95. Id at 316.
96. Id at 331.
97. Id at 332; see Simmons, 512 U.S. at 177 (stating that "the prosecution is free to argue that
the defendant would be dangerous in prison").
98. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 333.
99. Id. at 334.
100. Id. at 332 (quoting Richmond, 495 S.E.2d at 696).
101. Id at 332 n.ll (quoting Simmons, 512 U.S. at 157).
102. Id. at 332-33.
103. Id at 333.
104. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 332.
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Despite this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless denied habeas relief
on the grounds that the error was harmless.' The court noted that the United
States Supreme Court has not decided if a court may apply the Brecht harmless
error test to a Simmons violation, but it nonetheless chose to do so in this case.
10 6
In Brecht, the Supreme Court held that a federal court cannot grant "habeas relief
to state prisoners for constitutional errors committed in state court absent a
showing that the error 'had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict.' "07 If the federal court had "grave doubt" about
the effect of the error, it would be required to grant relief.' Noting that the jury
heard evidence that Richmond raped his best friend's wife and then brutally
killed her and her young children, that he showed no remorse for the crimes, and
that he attempted to shift the blame to others, the Fourth Circuit disavowed any
"grave doubt" about the outcome of the sentencing hearing and found "it highly
unlikely that the jury, had it received a Simmons instruction, would have declined
to sentence Richmond to death."'" The court concluded, therefore, that the
Simmons error was indeed harmless and denied Richmond relief."0
IV. Application in Virginia
A. Procedural Default
Defense counsel should note the ways in which a procedural default can
damage a federal habeas corpus case. Richmondillustrates the difficulty of making
the kind of cause and prejudice showing that will overcome a state court proce-
dural error and allow a federal court the opportunity to review an important
claim. Ineffective assistance of counsel is often an essential claim in collateral
appeals, but Richmond's default in state court precluded the district court from
seriously considering his IAC arguments."' One could argue that the procedural
default of the IAC claims in itself merits an IAC claim, but because the Constitu-
tion does not guarantee the right to counsel-effective or otherwise-in collat-
105. Id. at 336.
106. Id. at 335; see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (defining the "harmless error" standard for federal
consideration of habeas corpus relieo.
107. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 335 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 336.
111. Had his attorneys not defaulted their IAC claims, for example, Richmond might have
argued that his trial counsel violated Wiggins v. Smith by not investigating the potential mitigating
value of Richmond's alleged sexual abuse when they learned of it from Richmond's sister. See
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003) (holding that when considering the effectiveness of
counsel's presentation of mitigation evidence in a death penalty case, "a court must consider not
only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence
would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further").
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eral appeals and because AEDPA precludes relief on the basis of the ineffective-
ness of state or federal habeas counsel, Richmond would find no relief in such
a claim." 2 Virginia practitioners should take heed of Richmond's dilemma and
avoid the kinds of procedural errors that will undercut their clients' chances for
federal as well as state review of the merits of their claims.
B. Morgan
The Morqan issue in Richmond raises a serious question about the defendant's
ability in voir dire to ascertain prospective jurors' beliefs about the death penalty
in the context of specific factual circumstances. Richmond attempted a question
that used the specifics of his own case, and the court rejected it as a "stakeout"
question." 3 In the Virginia case of Satcher v. Commonwealth,"4 the defendant
requested a question that was tied more closely to the details of his own case than
Richmond's question was. 5 In Satcher, defense counsel sought to ask, "if we
have a situation in which a young woman is raped, robbed by a person armed
with a deadly weapon, stabbed twenty-one times, beaten and murdered,. . . in
that type of situation do any of you believe that the imposition of the death
penalty would be the most appropriate sentence?""' 6 In affirming the circuit
court's denial of this question, the Supreme Court of Virginia cited cases in
which the defendant attempted to ask if the jurors believed that the death penalty
is " 'ordinarily the proper punishment'" for capital murder."' The court also
pointed to questions that asked if the death penalty was " 'the only appropriate
punishment for capital murder.' ,,1s In these cases, the Supreme Court of
Virginia approved the lower courts' rejection of the questions, and it found the
Satcher question to be similarly inappropriate." 9
Although the Richmond and Satcher questions might have been too fact-
specific to survive, they raise a question about the validity of asking prospective
jurors if they would ipsofacto vote for death given a specific statutory aggravator.
112. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (holding that a defendant has no
Constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000) (stating that " [t]he
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction
proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254"; part of
AEDPA).
113. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 329-30.
114. 421 S.E.2d 821 (Va. 1992).
115. See Satcher v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 821,829 (Va. 1992) (affirming the trial court's
denial of a capital defendant's voir dire question that referred specifically to the facts of the defen-
dant's own case).
116. Id at 829.
117. Id (quoting Patterson v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Va. 1981)).




In Ring v. AriZona,121 the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime and every element,
including statutory aggravators, that increase the potential penalty to death.
121
Ring relied on the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey'22 that
a defendant cannot be exposed "to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone."'1
23
In Sumner v. Shuman,'124 the United States Supreme Court squarely held that all
mandatory death penalty schemes violate the Eight Amendment. 21 In light of
Ring, Apprendi, and Shuman, Morgan should disqualify any potential juror who
would vote automatically for the death penalty in the presence of a specific
statutory aggravator.
C Simmons
Since Yarbrough v. Commonwealth,126 all Virginia capital defendants should
receive an instruction concerning their parole ineligibility regardless of the death-
qualifying aggravator.23 The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Yabrough that:
in the penalty-determination phase of [a capital murder] trial ... in
response to a proffer of a proper instruction from the defendant prior
to submitting the issue of penalty-determination to the jury or where
the defendant asks for such an instruction following an inquiry from
the jury during deliberations, the trial court shall instruct the jury that
the words "imprisonment for life" mean "imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole.' 28
Virginia practitioners should take note to request such an instruction during
every sentencing hearing for a defendant convicted of capital murder.
Additionally, given the Fourth Circuit's mention of a circuit split, Richmond
may have a question for certiorari: must a federal court apply the Brecht harmless
error test when faced with an unreasonable application of Simmons? Richmond
may find hope in the United States Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Kelly v.
120. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
121. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002).
122. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
123. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000).
124. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
125. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,85 (1987). In Shuman, the Court struck down a Nevada
statute that mandated death for all life-felon prison inmates who commit a murder in prison. Id.
126. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).




South Carolina,129 despite the fact that Kelly was decided on direct appeal. 30 In
Kelly, the Court reversed a defendant's death sentence for the state court's
violation of Simmons without applying any harmless error anaylsis, much less the
rigorous habeas standard required by Brecht, thereby suggesting that due process
requires the Simmons instruction when the prosecution argues future dangerous-
ness, regardless of the actual effect on the jurors of the instruction's absence. 3'
The Supreme Court stated that "[a trial judge's duty is to give instructions
sufficient to explain the law, an obligation that exists independently of any
question from the jurors or any other indication of perplexity on their part."' 32
It is thus arguable that a Simmons instruction is so fundamental to due process
that the United States Supreme Court will not require a harmless error analysis.
Moreover, even if harmless error analysis is appropriate for Simmons viola-
tions, then the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Richmond is potentially inadequate.
Richmond may be the first case in which a United States Court of Appeals found
a Simmons error to be harmless. The Fourth Circuit found the error to be harm-
less without considering any of the mitigating evidence in the case.'33 Although
the weight of the evidence in aggravation is surely a relevant factor to consider,
the Fourth Circuit failed to appreciate that a Simmons instruction may be espe-
cially important in highly aggravated cases precisely because it heightens the
importance of reassuring the jury that the defendant will be both severely pun-
ished and permanently incapacitated if his life is spared. For a jury to make the
decision of how harshly to punish a defendant who has committed an especially
heinous murder, it must know that the defendant has no possibility of life outside
of prison.
V. Conclusion
Despite finding that the Supreme Court of North Carolina erred unreason-
ably in its application of Simmons, the Fourth Circuit denied Richmond's habeas
petition because it concluded that the facts of the case presented to the jury
weighed so overwhelmingly in favor of a death sentence that the trial court's
error in refusing to inform the jury about Richmond's parole ineligibility was
129. 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
130. See Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248 (2002) (emphasizing the Simmons holding
"that when a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative
to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entities
the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility' "); see also Shafer v. South Carolina, 532
U.S. 36,40 (2001) (reversing defendant's conviction despite the State's argument that the new South
Carolina sentencing options made unnecessary a Simmons instruction when the prosecutor has
argued future dangerousness).
131. Kel, 534 U.S. at 248.
132. Id. at 256.
133. Richmond, 375 F.3d at 334.
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harmless. The case does not, however, resolve the questions about the appropri-
ateness of "harmless error" analysis of Simmons violations. Nor does it explore
the proper mode of conducting such analysis in cases like this one.
Tamara L. Graham
